Abstract. The Random Oracle Model and the Ideal Cipher Model are two well known idealised models of computation for proving the security of cryptosystems. At Crypto 2005, Coron et al. showed that security in the random oracle model implies security in the ideal cipher model; namely they showed that a random oracle can be replaced by a block cipher-based construction, and the resulting scheme remains secure in the ideal cipher model. The other direction was left as an open problem, i.e. constructing an ideal cipher from a random oracle. In this paper we solve this open problem and show that the Feistel construction with 6 rounds is enough to obtain an ideal cipher; we also show that 5 rounds are insufficient by providing a simple attack. This contrasts with the classical Luby-Rackoff result that 4 rounds are necessary and sufficient to obtain a (strong) pseudo-random permutation from a pseudo-random function.
Introduction
Modern cryptography is about defining security notions and then constructing schemes that provably achieve these notions. In cryptography, security proofs are often relative: a scheme is proven secure, assuming that some computational problem is hard to solve. For a given functionality, the goal is therefore to obtain an efficient scheme that is secure under a well known computational assumption (for example, factoring is hard). However for certain functionalities, or to get a more efficient scheme, it is sometimes necessary to work in some idealised model of computation.
The well known Random Oracle Model (ROM), formalised by Bellare and Rogaway [1] , is one such model. In the random oracle model, one assumes that some hash function is replaced by a publicly accessible random function (the random oracle). This means that the adversary cannot compute the result of the hash function by himself: he must query the random oracle. The random oracle model has been used to prove the security of numerous cryptosystems, and it has lead to simple and efficient designs that are widely used in practice (such as PSS [2] and OAEP [3] ). Obviously, a proof in the random oracle model is not fully satisfactory, because such a proof does not imply that the scheme will remain secure when the random oracle is replaced by a concrete hash function (such as SHA-1). Numerous papers have shown artificial schemes that are provably secure in the ROM, but completely insecure when the RO is instantiated with any function family (see [7] ). Despite these separation results, the ROM still appears to be a useful tool for proving the security of cryptosystems. For some functionalities, the ROM construction is actually the only known construction (for example, for non-sequential aggregate signatures [6] ).
The Ideal Cipher Model (ICM) is another idealised model of computation, similar to the ROM. Instead of having a publicly accessible random function, one has a publicly accessible random block cipher (or ideal cipher). This is a block cipher with a κ-bit key and a n-bit input/output, that is chosen uniformly at random among all block ciphers of this form; this is equivalent to having a family of 2 κ independent random permutations. All parties including the adversary can make both encryption and decryption queries to the ideal block cipher, for any given key. As for the random oracle model, many schemes have been proven secure in the ICM [5, 10, 13, 15] . As for the ROM, it is possible to construct artificial schemes that are secure in the ICM but insecure for any concrete block cipher (see [4] ). Still, a proof in the ideal cipher model seems useful because it shows that a scheme is secure against generic attacks, that do not exploit specific weaknesses of the underlying block cipher.
A natural question is whether the random oracle model and the ideal cipher model are equivalent models, or whether one model is strictly stronger than the other. Given a scheme secure with random oracles, is it possible to replace the random oracles with a block cipher-based construction, and obtain a scheme that is still secure in the ideal cipher model? Conversely, if a scheme is secure in the ideal cipher model, is it possible to replace the ideal cipher with a construction based on functions, and get a scheme that is still secure when these functions are seen as random oracles?
At Crypto 2005, Coron et al. [9] showed that it is indeed possible to replace a random oracle (taking arbitrary long inputs) by a block cipher-based construction. The proof is based on an extension of the classical notion of indistinguishability, called indifferentiability, introduced by Maurer et al. in [17] . Using this notion of indifferentiability, the authors of [9] gave the definition of an "indifferentiable construction" of one ideal primitive (F) (for example, a random oracle) from another ideal primitive (G) (for example an ideal block cipher). When a construction satisfies this notion, any scheme that is secure in the former ideal model (F) remains secure in the latter model (G), when instantiated using this construction. The authors of [9] proposed a slight variant of the Merkle-Damgård construction to instantiate a random oracle (see Fig. 1 ). Given any scheme provably secure in the random oracle model, this construction can replace the random oracle, and the resulting scheme remains secure in the ideal cipher model; other constructions have been analysed in [8] . [9] based on an ideal cipher E (left) to replace a random oracle H (right). Messages blocks mi's are used as successive keys for the ideal-cipher E. IV is a pre-determined constant.
The other direction (constructing an ideal cipher from a random oracle) was left as an open problem in [9] . In this paper we solve this open problem and show that the Luby-Rackoff construction with 6 rounds is sufficient to instantiate an ideal cipher (see Fig. 2 for an illustration). Actually, it is easy to see that it is enough to construct a random permutation instead of an ideal cipher; namely, a family of 2 κ independent random permutations (i.e., an ideal block cipher) can be constructed by simply prepending a k-bit key to the inner random oracle functions F i 's. Therefore in this paper, we concentrate on the construction of a random permutation. We also show that 5 rounds Luby-Rackoff is insecure by providing a simple attack; this shows that 6 rounds is actually optimal. Our result shows that the random oracle model and the ideal cipher model are actually equivalent assumptions. It seems that up to now, many cryptographers have been reluctant to use the Ideal Cipher Model and have endeavoured to work in the Random Oracle Model, arguing that the ICM is richer and carries much more structure than the ROM. Our result shows that it is in fact not the case and that designers may use the ICM when they need it without making a stronger assumption than when working in the random oracle model. However, our security reduction is quite loose, which implies that in practice large security parameters should be used in order to replace an ideal cipher by a 6-round Luby-Rackoff.
We stress that the "indifferentiable construction" notion is very different from the classical indistinguishability notion. The well known Luby-Rackoff result that 4 rounds are enough to obtain a strong pseudo-random permutation from pseudo-random functions [16] , is proven under the classical indistinguishability notion. Under this notion, the adversary has only access to the input/output of the Luby-Rackoff (LR) construction, and tries to distinguish it from a random permutation; in particular it does not have access to the input/output of the inner pseudorandom functions. On the contrary, in our setting, the distinguisher can make oracle calls to the inner round functions F i 's (see Fig. 2 ); the indifferentiability notion enables to accommodate these additional oracle calls in a coherent definition.
Related Work
One of the first paper to consider having access to the inner round functions of a Luby-Rackoff is [19] ; the authors showed that Luby-Rackoff with 4 rounds remains secure if adversary has oracle access to the middle two round functions, but becomes insecure if adversary is allowed access to any other round functions.
In [14] a random permutation oracle was instantiated for a specific scheme using a 4-rounds Luby-Rackoff. More precisely, the authors showed that the random permutation oracle P in the Even-Mansour [13] block-cipher E k 1 ,k 2 (m) = k 2 ⊕ P (m ⊕ k 1 ) can be replaced by a 4-rounds Luby-Rackoff, and the block-cipher E remains secure in the random oracle model; for this specific scheme, the authors obtained a (much) better security bound than our general bound in this paper.
In [11] , Dodis and Puniya introduced a different model for indifferentiability, called indifferentiability in the honest-but-curious model. In this model, the distinguisher is not allowed to make direct calls to the inner hash functions; instead he can only query the global LubyRackoff construction and get all the intermediate results. The authors showed that in this model, a Luby-Rackoff construction with a super-logarithmic number of rounds can replace an ideal cipher. The authors also showed that indifferentiability in the honest-but-curious model implies indifferentiability in the general model, for LR constructions with up to a logarithmic number of rounds. But because of this gap between logarithmic and super-logarithmic, the authors could not conclude about general indifferentiability of Luby-Rackoff constructions. Subsequent work by Dodis and Puniya [12] studied other properties (such as unpredictability and verifiablity) of the Luby-Rackoff construction when the intermediate values are known to the attacker.
In this paper we have an observation about indifferentiability in the honest-but-curious model: we show that general indifferentiability does not necessarily imply indifferentiability in the honest-but-curious model. More precisely, we show in Appendix B that LR constructions with up to logarithmic number of rounds are not indifferentiable from a random permutation in the honest-but-curious model, whereas our main result in this paper is that 6-rounds LR is indifferentiable from a random permutation in the general model.
Definitions
In this section, we recall the notion of indifferentiability of random systems, introduced by Maurer et al. in [17] . This is an extension of the classical notion of indistinguishability, where one or more oracles are publicly available, such as random oracles or ideal ciphers.
We first motivate why such an extension is actually required. The classical notion of indistinguishability enables to argue that if some system S 1 is indistinguishable from some other system S 2 (for any polynomially bounded attacker), then any application that uses S 1 can use S 2 instead, without any loss of security; namely, any non-negligible loss of security would precisely be a way of distinguishing between the two systems. Since we are interested in replacing a random permutation (or an ideal cipher) by a Luby-Rackoff construction, we would like to say that the Luby-Rackoff construction is "indistinguishable" from a random permutation. However, when the distinguisher can make oracle calls to the inner round functions, one cannot say that the two systems are "indistinguishable" because they don't even have the same interface (see Fig. 2) ; namely for the LR construction the distinguisher can make oracle calls to the inner functions F i 's, whereas for the random permutation he can only query the input and receive the output and vice versa. This contrasts with the setting of the classical Luby-Rackoff result, where the adversary has only access to the input/output of the LR construction, and tries to distinguish it from a random permutation. Therefore, an extension of the classical notion of indistinguishability is required, in order to show that some ideal primitive (like a random permutation) can be constructed from another ideal primitive (like a random oracle).
Following [17] , we define an ideal primitive as an algorithmic entity which receives inputs from one of the parties and delivers its output immediately to the querying party. The ideal primitives that we consider in this paper are random oracles and random permutations (or ideal ciphers). A random oracle [1] is an ideal primitive which provides a random output for each new query. Identical input queries are given the same answer. A random permutation is an ideal primitive that contains a random permutation P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . The ideal primitive provides oracle access to P and P −1 . An ideal cipher is an ideal primitive that models a random block cipher E : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . Each key k ∈ {0, 1} κ defines a random permutation E k = E(k, ·) on {0, 1} n . The ideal primitive provides oracle access to E and E −1 ; that is, on query (0, k, m), the primitive answers c = E k (m), and on query (1, k, c), the primitive answers m such that c = E k (m). These oracles are available for any n and any κ.
The notion of indifferentiability [17] is used to show that an ideal primitive P (for example, a random permutation) can be replaced by a construction C that is based on some other ideal primitive F (for example, C is the LR construction based on a random oracle F ):
Definition 1 ([17]).
A Turing machine C with oracle access to an ideal primitive F is said to be (t D , t S , q, ε)-indifferentiable from an ideal primitive P if there exists a simulator S with oracle access to P and running in time at most t S , such that for any distinguisher D running in time at most t D and making at mostueries, it holds that:
C F is simply said to be indifferentiable from F if ε is a negligible function of the security parameter n, for polynomially bounded q, t D and t S . The previous definition is illustrated in Figure 3 , where P is a random permutation, C is a Luby-Rackoff construction LR, and F is a random oracle. In this paper, for a 6-round LubyRackoff, we denote these random oracles F 1 , . . . , F 6 (see Fig. 2 ). Equivalently, one can consider a single random oracle F and encode in the first 3 input bits which round function F 1 , . . . , F 6 is actually called. The distinguisher has either access to the system formed by the construction LR and the random oracle F , or to the system formed by the random permutation P and a simulator S. In the first system (left), the construction LR computes its output by making calls to F (this corresponds to the round functions F i 's of the Luby-Rackoff); the distinguisher can also make calls to F directly. In the second system (right), the distinguisher can either query the random permutation P , or the simulator that can make queries to P . We see that the role of the simulator is to simulate the random oracles F i 's so that no distinguisher can tell whether it is interacting with LR and F , or with P and S. In other words, 1) the output of S should be indistinguishable from that of random oracles F i 's and 2) the output of S should look "consistent" with what the distinguisher can obtain from P . We stress that the simulator does not see the distinguisher's queries to P ; however, it can call P directly when needed for the simulation. Note that the two systems have the same interface, so now it makes sense to require that the two systems be indistinguishable.
To summarise, in the first system the random oracles F i are chosen at random, and a permutation C = LR is constructed from them with a 6 rounds Luby-Rackoff. In the second system the random permutation P is chosen at random and the inner round functions F i 's are simulated by a simulator with oracle access to P . Those two systems should be indistinguishable, that is the distinguisher should not be able to tell whether the inner round functions were chosen at random and then the Luby-Rackoff permutation constructed from it, or the random permutation was chosen at random and the inner round functions then "tailored" to match the permutation.
It is shown in [17] that the indifferentiability notion is the "right" notion for substituting one ideal primitive with a construction based on another ideal primitive. That is, if C F is indifferentiable from an ideal primitive P, then C F can replace P in any cryptosystem, and the resulting cryptosystem is at least as secure in the F model as in the P model; see [17] or [9] for a proof. Our main result in this paper is that the 6 rounds Luby-Rackoff construction is indifferentiable from a random permutation; this implies that such a construction can replace a random permutation (or an ideal cipher) in any cryptosystem, and the resulting scheme remains secure in the random oracle model if the original scheme was secure in the random permutation (or ideal cipher) model.
Attack of Luby-Rackoff with 5 Rounds
In this section we show that 5 rounds are not enough to obtain the indifferentiability property. We do this by exhibiting for the 5 rounds Luby-Rackoff (see Fig. 4 ) a property that cannot be obtained with a random permutation. Let Y and Y ′ be arbitrary values, corresponding to inputs of F 3 (see Fig. 4 ); let Z be another arbitrary value, corresponding to input of F 4 . Let
and let:
From X, X ′ , Y and Y ′ we now define four couples (X i , Y i ) as follows:
and we let L i R i be the four corresponding plaintexts; we have:
Let Z 0 , Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 be the corresponding values as input of F 4 ; we have from (1) and (2):
Finally, let S i T i be the four corresponding ciphertexts; we have:
We obtain the relations:
Thus, we have obtained four pairs (plaintext, ciphertext) such that the xor of the right part of the four plaintexts equals 0 and the xor of the left part of the four ciphertexts also equals 0. For a random permutation, it is easy to see that such a property can only be obtained with negligible probability, when the number of queries is polynomially bounded. Thus we have shown:
Theorem 1. The Luby-Rackoff construction with 5 rounds is not indifferentiable from a random permutation.
This contrasts with the classical Luby-Rackoff result, where 4 rounds are enough to obtain a strong pseudo-random permutation from pseudo-random functions.
Indifferentiability of Luby-Rackoff with 6 Rounds
We now prove our main result: the Luby-Rackoff construction with 6 rounds is indifferentiable from a random permutation.
Theorem 2. The LR construction with 6 rounds is (t D , t S , q, ε)-indifferentiable from a random permutation, with t S = O(q 8 ) and ε = 2 24 · q 16 /2 n , where n is the output size of the round functions.
Note that here the distinguisher has unbounded running time; it is only bounded to askueries. As illustrated in Figure 3 , we must construct a simulator S such that the two systems formed by (LR, F ) and (P, S) are indistinguishable. The simulator is constructed in Section 4.1, while the indistinguishability property is proved in Section 4.2.
The Simulator
We construct a simulator S that simulates the random oracles F 1 , . . . , F 6 . For each function F i the simulator maintains an history of already answered queries. We write x ∈ F i when x belongs to the history of F i , and we denote by F i (x) the corresponding output. When we need to obtain F i (x) and x does not belong to the history of F i , we write F i (x) ← y to determine that the answer to F i query x will be y; we then add (x, F i (x)) to the history of F i . We denote by n the output size of the functions F i 's. We denote by LR and LR −1 the 6-round Luby-Rackoff construction as obtained from the functions F i 's.
We first provide an intuition of the simulator's algorithm. The simulator must make sure that his answers to the distinguisher's F i queries are coherent with the answers to P queries that can be obtained independently by the distinguisher. In other words, when the distinguisher makes F i queries to the simulator (possibly in some arbitrary order), the output generated by the corresponding Luby-Rackoff must be the same as the output from P obtained independently by the distinguisher. We stress that those P queries made by the distinguisher cannot be seen by the simulator; the simulator is only allowed to make his own P queries (as illustrated in Fig.  3 ). In addition, the simulator's answer to F i queries must be statistically close to the output of random functions.
The simulator's strategy is the following: when a "chain of 3 queries" has been made by the distinguisher, the simulator is going to define the values of all the other F i 's corresponding to this chain, by making a P or a P −1 query, so that the output of LR and the output of P are the same for the corresponding message. Roughly speaking, we say that we have a chain of 3 queries (x, y, z) when x, y, z are in the history of F k , F k+1 and F k+2 respectively and x = F k+1 (y) ⊕ z.
For example, if a query X to F 2 is received, and we have X = F 3 (Y )⊕ Z where Y , Z belong to the history of F 3 and F 4 respectively, then the triple (X, Y, Z) forms a 3-chain of queries. In this case, the simulator defines
. The values of F 5 (A) and F 6 (S) are then "adapted" so that the 6-round LR and the random permutation provide the same output, i.e. the simulator defines
In summary, given a F 2 query, the simulator looked at the history of (F 3 , F 4 ) and adapted the answers of (F 5 , F 6 ).
More generally, given a query to F k , the simulator proceeds according to Table 1 below; we denote by + for looking downward in the LR construction and by − for looking upward. The simulator must first simulate an additional call to F i (column "Call"). Then the simulator can compute either L R or S T (as determined in column "Compute"). Given L R (resp. S T ) the simulator makes a P -query (resp. a P −1 -query) to obtain S T = P (L R) (resp. L R = P −1 (S T )). Finally Table 1 indicates the index j for which the output of (F j , F j+1 ) is adapted (column "Adapt").
Query Dir History Call Compute Adapt For Line (F 2 , +) in Table 1 , given a query X to F 2 , the simulator must actually consider all 3-chains formed by (X, Y, Z), where Y ∈ F 3 and Z ∈ F 4 ; formally, one defines the following set:
where +1 corresponds to looking downward in the Luby-Rackoff construction. Similarly for Line (F 3 , +):
Symmetrically for Lines (F 5 , −) and (F 4 , −):
Additionally with Line (F 6 , +) one must consider the 3-chains obtained from a F 6 query S and looking in (F 1 , F 2 ) history:
and symmetrically with Line (F 1 , −) the 3-chains obtained from a F 1 query R and looking in (F 5 , F 6 ) history:
With Lines (F 2 , −) and (F 5 , +), one must also consider the 3-chains associated with (F 1 , F 6 ) history, obtained either from a F 2 query X or a F 5 query A. Given a F 2 query X, we consider all R ∈ F 1 , and for each corresponding L = X ⊕ F 1 (R), we compute S T = P (L R) and determine whether S ∈ F 6 . Additionally, we also consider "virtual" 3-chains, where
Formally, we denote :
whereF 6 in Chain(−1, X, 2) is defined as:
and symmetrically for Line (F 5 , +):
When the simulator receives a query x for F k from the distinguisher, it then proceeds as follows:
The ChainQuery algorithm is used to handle all possible 3-chains created by the operation
ChainQuery(x, k):
The CompleteChain(b, x, y, z, k) works as follows: it computes the message L R or S T that corresponds to the 3-chain (x, y, z) given as input, without querying (F j , F j+1 ), where j is the index given in Table 1 (column "Adapt"). If L R is first computed, then the simulator makes a P query to obtain S T = P (L R); similarly, if S T is first computed, then the simulator makes a P −1 query to obtain L R = P −1 (S T ). The output of functions (F j , F j+1 ) is adapted so that LR(L R) = S T . The CompleteChain algorithm eventually returns the set of variables which were added in the history of the F i 's; then for each of these variables the ChainQuery algorithm is recursively applied. , 5) and y / ∈ F 1 , then let F 1 (y) ← {0, 1} n and U ← U ∪ {(y, 1)} 4. Given (b, k) and from Table 1: (a) Determine the index i of the additional call to F i (column "Call"), and let x i be the corresponding input to F i . (b) Determine whether L R or S T must be computed first. (c) Determine the index j for adaptation at (F j , F j+1 ) (column "Adapt"). 5 . If
. Compute the message L R or S T corresponding to the 3-chain (x, y, z). 7 . If L R has been computed, make a P query to get S T = P (L R); otherwise, make a P −1 query to get L R = P −1 (S T ). 8 . Now all input values (x 1 , . . . , x 6 ) to (F 1 , . . . , F 6 ) corresponding to the 3-chain (x, y, z) are known. Additionally let x 0 ← L and x 7 ← T . 9 . If x j is in the history of F j or x j+1 is in the history of F j+1 , abort. 10 . Define
Finally, the XorQuery 1 (x, k), XorQuery 2 (x, k) and XorQuery 3 (x, k) algorithms are defined as follows:
(a) If k = 6 and for some
Additionally the simulator maintains an upper bound B max on the size of the history of each of the F i 's; if this bound is reached, then the simulator aborts; the value of B max will be determined later. This terminates the description of the simulator.
We note that all lines in Table 1 are necessary to ensure that the simulation of the F i 's is coherent with what the distinguisher can obtain independently from P . For example, if we suppress the line (F 2 , +) in the table, the distinguisher can make a query for Z to F 4 , then Y to F 3 and X = F 3 (Y ) ⊕ Z to F 2 , then A = F 4 (Z) ⊕ Y to F 5 and since it is not possible anymore to adapt the output of (F 1 , F 2 ), the simulator fails to provide a coherent simulation.
We also note that a simulator would necessarily fail for a 5-rounds LR: using the same approach as in Section 3, the distinguisher can ask F 3 (Y ) and
; when queried for F 4 (Z), the simulator can adapt the answer of F 4 (Z) corresponding to chain (X, Y, Z), and adapt the answer of F 2 (X ′ ) for chain (X ′ , Y ′ , Z); however, when queried for F 4 (Z ′ ), the simulator cannot adapt the answer of F 4 (Z ′ ) for both chains (X, Y ′ , Z ′ ) and (X ′ , Y, Z ′ ). We also note that one could have taken 12 lines in Table 1 instead of 8, by taking both directions + and − for each of the F i 's, and without considering "virtual" 3-chains in equations (5) and (6); however in this case it seems harder to bound the simulator's running time.
Our simulator makes recursive calls to the Query and ChainQuery algorithms. The simulator aborts when the history size of one of the F i 's is greater than B max . Therefore we must prove that despite these recursive calls, this bound B max is never reached, except with negligible probability, for B max polynomial in the security parameter. The main argument is that the number of 3-chains in the sets Chain(b, x, k) that involve the P permutation (equations (3), (4), (5) and (6)), must be upper bounded by the number of P/P −1 -queries made by the distinguisher, which is upper bounded by q. This gives an upper bound on the number of recursive queries to F 3 , F 4 , which in turn implies an upper bound on the history of the other F i 's. Additionally, one must show that the simulator never aborts at Step 9 in the CompleteChain algorithm, except with negligible probability. This is summarised in the following lemma: Lemma 1. Let q be the maximum number of queries made by the distinguisher and let B max = 5q 2 . The simulator S runs in time O(q 8 ), and aborts with probability at most 2 15 · q 10 /2 n , while making at most 2 10 · q 8 queries to P or P −1 .
Proof. See Appendix A
Indifferentiability
We now proceed to prove the indifferentiability result. As illustrated in Figure 3 , we must show that given the previous simulator S, the two systems formed by (LR, F ) and (P, S) are indistinguishable.
We consider a distinguisher D making at mostueries to the system (LR, F ) or (P, S) and outputting a bit γ. We define a sequence Game 0 , Game 1 , . . . of modified distinguisher games. In the first game Game 0 , the distinguisher interacts with the system formed by the random permutation P and the previously defined simulator S. In the subsequent games the system is modified so that in the last game the distinguisher interacts with (LR, F ). We denote by S i the event in game i that the distinguisher outputs γ = 1.
Game 0 : the distinguisher interacts with the simulator S and the random permutation P .
Game 1 : we make a minor change in the way F i queries are answered by the simulator, to prepare a more important step in the next game. In Game 0 we have that a F i query for x can be answered in two different ways: either F i (x) $ ← {0, 1}, or the value F i (x) is "adapted" by the simulator.
In Game 1 , instead of letting
, the new simulator S ′ makes a query to a random oracle F i which returns F i (x); see Fig. 5 for an illustration. Since we have simply replaced one set of random variables by a different, but identically distributed, set of random variables, we have:
Game 2 : we modify the way P and P −1 queries are answered. Instead of returning P (L R) with random permutation P , the system returns LR(L R) by calling the random oracles F i 's (and similarly for P −1 queries).
We must show that the distinguisher's view has statistically close distribution in Game 1 and Game 2 . For this, we consider the subsystem T with the random permutation P/P −1 and the random oracles F i 's in Game 1 , and the subsystem T ′ with Luby-Rackoff LR and random oracle F i 's in Game 2 (see Fig. 5 ). We show that the output of systems T and T ′ is statistically close; this in turn shows that the distinguisher's view has statistically close distribution in Game 1 and Game 2 . 4 In the following, we assume that the distinguisher eventually makes a sequence of F i -queries corresponding to all previous P/P −1 queries made by the distinguisher; this is without loss of generality, because from any distinguisher D we can build a distinguisher D ′ with the same output that satisfies this property.
The outputs to F i queries provided by subsystem T in Game 1 and by subsystem T ′ in Game 2 are the same, since in both cases these queries are answered by random oracles F i . Therefore, we must show that the output to P/P −1 queries provided by T and T ′ have statistically close distribution, when the outputs to F i queries provided by T or T ′ are fixed.
We can distinguish two types of P/P −1 queries to T or T ′ :
-Type I: P/P −1 queries made by the distinguisher, or by the simulator during execution of the CompleteChain algorithm. From Lemma 1 there are at most B max + q ≤ 6q 2 such queries. 4 We do not claim that subsystems T and T ′ are indistinguishable for any possible sequence of queries (this is clearly false); we only show that T and T ′ have statistically close outputs for the particular sequence of queries made by the simulator and the distinguisher.
-Type II: P/P −1 queries made by the simulator when computing the sets Chain(+1, S, 6), Chain(−1, R, 1), Chain(+1, A, 5) and Chain(−1, X, 2) and executing algorithms XorQuery 1 , XorQuery 2 and XorQuery 3 , which are not of Type I. From Lemma 1 there are at most Q P = 2 10 · q 8 such queries.
We first consider Type I queries. Recall that the distinguisher is assumed to eventually make all the F i queries corresponding to his P/P −1 queries; consequently at the end of the distinguisher's queries, the CompleteChain algorithm has been executed for all 3-chains corresponding to P/P −1 queries of Type I. We consider one such P query L R (the argument for P −1 query is similar) of Type I. In Game 2 the answer S T can be written as follows:
where
, r 5 = F 5 (A) and r 6 = F 6 (S), and (X, Y, Z, A) are defined in the usual way. Let j be the index used at steps 10 and 11 of the corresponding CompleteChain execution, and let x j , x j+1 be the corresponding inputs. If the simulator does not abort during CompleteChain, this implies that the values r j = F j (x j ) and r j+1 = F j+1 (x j+1 ) have not appeared before in the simulator's execution. This implies that r j = F j (x j ) and r j+1 = F j+1 (x j+1 ) have not appeared in a previous P/P −1 -query (since otherwise it would have been defined in the corresponding CompleteChain execution), and moreover F j (x j ) and F j+1 (x j+1 ) have not been queried before to subsystem T ′ . Moreover since the values r j = F j (x j ) and r j+1 = F j+1 (x j+1 ) are defined by the simulator at steps 10 and 11 of CompleteChain, these values will not be queried later to T ′ . Therefore we have that r j = F j (x j ) and r j+1 = F j+1 (x j+1 ) are not included in the subsystem T ′ output; T ′ output can only include randoms in (r 1 , . . . , r j−1 , r j+2 , . . . , r 6 ). Therefore, we obtain from equation (7) that for fixed randoms (r 1 , . . . , r j−1 , r j+2 , . . . , r 6 ) the distribution of S T = LR(L R) in Game 2 is uniform in {0, 1} 2n and independent from the output of previous P/P −1 queries.
In Game 1 , the output to query L R is S T = P (L R); since there are at most q+B max ≤ 6·q 2 Type I queries to P/P −1 , the statistical distance between P (L R) and LR(L R) is at most 6 · q 2 /2 2n . This holds for a single P/P −1 query of Type I. Since there are at most 6 · q 2 such queries, we obtain the following statistical distance δ between outputs of systems T and T ′ to Type I queries, conditioned on the event that the simulator does not abort:
We now consider P/P −1 queries of Type II; from Lemma 1 there are at most Q P = 2 10 · q 8 such queries. We first consider the sets Chain(+1, S, 6) and Chain(−1, X, 2):
and we consider a corresponding query L R to P , where L = F 1 (R) ⊕ X. By definition this query is not of Type I, so no CompleteChain execution has occurred corresponding to this query. Given (R, X) ∈ Chain(+1, S, 6) or for (R, S) ∈ Chain(−1, X, 2), we let Y = F 2 (X) ⊕ R. If Y is not in the history of F 3 , we let F 3 (Y ) $ ← {0, 1} n ; in this case, Z = X ⊕ F 3 (Y ) has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n ; this implies that Z belongs to the history of F 4 with probability at most |F 4 |/2 n ≤ 2q/2 n . If Y belongs to the history of F 3 , then we have that Z cannot be in the history of F 4 , otherwise 3-chain (X, Y, Z) would already have appeared in CompleteChain algorithm, from Line (F 2 , +) and (F 4 , −) in Table 1 . Therefore, we have that for all P queries L R of Type II, no corresponding value of Z belongs to the history of F 4 , except with probability at most Q P · 2q/2 n .
We now consider the sequence (L i , R i ) of distinct P -queries of Type II corresponding to the previous sets Chain(+1, S, 6) and Chain(−1, X, 2). We must show that in Game 2 the output (S i , T i ) provided by T ′ has a distribution that is statistically close to uniform, when the outputs to F i queries provided by T ′ are fixed. We consider the corresponding sequence of (Y i , Z i ); as explained previously, no Z i belongs to the simulator's history of F 4 , except with probability at most Q P · 2q/2 n . We claim that F 4 (Z i ) ⊕ Y i = F 4 (Z j ) ⊕ Y j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ Q P , except with probability at most (Q P ) 2 /2 n . We distinguish two cases. If Z i = Z j for some i < j, then
, a contradiction since we have assumed the (L i , R i ) queries to be distinct. If Z i = Z j for all i < j, then we have that
happens with probability at most 2 −n ; since there are at most (Q P ) 2 such i, j, we have that F 4 (Z i ) ⊕ Y i = F 4 (Z j ) ⊕ Z j for some i < j happens with probability at most (Q P ) 2 /2 n . This implies that the elements A i = Y i ⊕ F 4 (Z i ) are all distinct, except with probability at most (Q P ) 2 /2 n . Therefore elements S i = Z i ⊕ F 5 (A i ) are uniformly and independently distributed in {0, 1} n ; this implies that elements S i are all distinct, except with probability at most (Q P ) 2 /2 n , which implies that elements T i = A i ⊕ F 6 (S i ) are uniformly and independently distributed in {0, 1} n . For each (S i , T i ), the statistical distance with P (L i R i ) in Game 1 is therefore at most Q P /2 2n . The previous arguments are conditioned on the event that no A i or S i belongs to the simulator's history for F 5 and F 6 , which for each A i or S i happens with probability at most B max /2 n . The reasoning for the sets Chain(−1, R, 1), Chain(+1, A, 5) is symmetric so we omit it. The reasoning for the XorQuery 1 , XorQuery 2 and XorQuery 3 calls is also the same so we omit it. We obtain that the statistical distance δ 2 between the output of Type II P/P −1 queries in Game 1 and Game 2 is at most (conditioned on the event that the simulator does not abort):
Let denote by Abort the event that the simulator aborts in Game 1 ; we obtain from Lemma 1 and inequalities (8) and (9) :
Game 3 : the distinguisher interacts with random system (LR, F ). We have that system (LR, F ) provides the same outputs as the system in Game 2 except if the simulator fails in Game 2 . Namely, when the output values of (F j , F j+1 ) are adapted (steps 10 and 11 of CompleteChain algorithm), the values F j (x j ) and F j+1 (x j+1 ) are the same as the one obtained directly from random oracles F j and F j+1 , because in Game 2 the P/P −1 queries are answered using LR/LR −1 . Let denote by Abort 2 the event that simulator aborts in Game 2 ; we have:
which gives:
From the previous inequalities, we obtain the following upper bound on the distinguisher's advantage: 16 2 n which terminates the proof of Theorem 2.
Conclusion and Further Research
We have shown that the 6 rounds Feistel construction is indifferentiable from a random permutation, a problem that was left open in [9] . This shows that the random oracle model and the ideal cipher model are equivalent models. A natural question is whether our security bound in q 8 /2 n is optimal or not. We are currently investigating:
-a better bound for 6 rounds (or more), -best exponential attacks against 6 rounds (or more), -other models of indifferentiability with possibly simpler proofs. 
A Proof of Lemma 1

A.1 Simulator's Running Time
We first give an upper bound on the total number of executions of CompleteChain(b, x, y, z, k) for (b, k) ∈ {(+1, 6), (−1, 2), (−1, 1), (+1, 5)}. We first consider the set:
that generates executions of CompleteChain(+1, S, R, X, 6). We denote by cbad 6 the event that CompleteChain(+1, S, R, X, 6) was called while X ⊕ F 1 (R) R has not appeared in a P/P −1 query made by the distinguisher. Similarly, considering the set:
we denote by cbad 2 the event that CompleteChain(−1, X, R, S, 2) was called while X ⊕ F 1 (R) R has not appeared in a P/P −1 query made by the distinguisher. Symmetrically, we denote by cbad 1 and cbad 5 the events for CompleteChain(−1, R, A, S, 1) and CompleteChain(+1, A, R, S, 5).
Lemma 2. The total number of executions of CompleteChain(b, x, y, z, k) for (b, k) ∈ {(+1, 6), (−1, 2), (−1, 1), (+1, 5)} is upper bounded by the number of P/P −1 queries made by the distinguisher, unless event cbad occurs, which happens with probability at most:
Proof. If event cbad has not occurred, then the distinguisher has made a P/P −1 query corresponding to all pairs (x, y) in CompleteChain(b, x, y, z, k) for (b, k) ∈ {(+1, 6), (−1, 2), (−1, 1), (+1, 5)}; since the distinguisher makes at mostueries, the total number of executions is then upper bounded by q. We first consider event cbad 6 corresponding to Chain(+1, S, 6). If L R with L = X ⊕ F 1 (R) has never appeared in a P/P −1 query made by the distinguisher, then the probability that P (L R) = S T for some T is at most 2 −n . For a single S query to F 6 , the probability that cbad 6 occurs is then at most |F 1 | · |F 2 |/2 n ≤ (B max ) 2 /2 n . Since there has been at most B max such queries to F 6 , this gives: 3 2 n Symmetrically, the same bound holds for event cbad 1 .
Similarly, for event cbad 2 , if the distinguisher has not made a query for P (L R) where L = X ⊕ F 1 (R), then the probability that P (L R) = S T with S ∈F 6 is at most |F 6 |/2 n , where 2 . For a single X query, this implies that event cbad 2 occurs with probability at most |F 1 | · |F 6 |/2 n ; since there are at most B max such queries, this gives: 4 2 n Symmetrically, the same bound holds for event cbad 5 . From the previous inequalities we obtain the required bound for Pr [cbad] .
⊓ ⊔ Using a similar argument, we now give an upper-bound on the number of additional F i calls made by the XorQuery 1 , XorQuery 2 and XorQuery 3 algorithms. For XorQuery 1 , we denote by xbad 1 the event that F 5 (A ′ ) $ ← {0, 1} n occurred while S F 6 (S) ⊕ A ′ has never appeared in a P/P −1 query made by the distinguisher. We denote by xbad ′ 1 the symmetric event for
For XorQuery 2 , we denote by xbad 2 the event that
has never appeared in a P/P −1 query made by the distinguisher.
We denote by xbad ′ 2 the symmetric event for F 6 (S) $ ← {0, 1} n . For XorQuery 3 , we denote by
never appeared in a P/P −1 query. We denote by xbad ′ 3 the symmetric event for
Lemma 3. The total number of F i (x) $ ← {0, 1} n executions made by algorithms XorQuery 1 , XorQuery 2 and XorQuery 3 is upper-bounded by the number of P/P −1 queries made by the distinguisher, unless event xbad occurs, with:
Proof. As previously, if event xbad has not occurred, then the distinguisher has made a P/P −1 query corresponding to all additional F i calls made by XorQuery 1 , XorQuery 2 and XorQuery 3 ; the number of additional F i calls is then upper-bounded by the number of P/P −1 queries made by the distinguisher. For XorQuery 1 (x, k), if the distinguisher has not made a P −1 query for S F 6 (S) ⊕ A ′ , then the probability that P (S F 6 (S) ⊕ A ′ ) = L R with R ∈ F 1 is at most |F 1 |/2 n . This holds for a given query x, a given S ∈ F 6 and a given A ′ ∈ A ′ . Since there are at most B max such queries x, this gives: . From these inequalities we get (11). ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 4. Taking B max = 5·q 2 , the history size of the simulator F i 's does not reach the bound B max , unless event bad = cbad ∨ xbad occurs, which happens with probability at most:
Proof. The 3-chains from Lines (F 6 , +), (F 2 , −), (F 1 , −) and (F 5 , +) in Table 1 are the only ones which can generate recursive calls to F 3 and F 4 , since the other 3-chains from Lines (F 2 , +), (F 3 , +), (F 4 , −) and (F 5 , −) always include elements in F 3 and F 4 histories; moreover the XorQuery 1 and XorQuery 2 algorithms do not generate calls to F 3 and F 4 . From Lemma 2 the total number of corresponding executions of CompleteChain(b, x, y, z, k) where (b, k) ∈ {(+1, 6), (−1, 2), (−1, 1), (+1, 5)} is upper bounded by the number of P/P −1 queries made by the distinguisher, unless event cbad occurs. Moreover from Lemma 3 the number of recursive queries made by XorQuery 3 algorithm to F 3 and F 4 is upper-bounded by the number of P/P −1 queries made by the distinguisher, unless event xbad occurs. Therefore, the total number of executions of CompleteChain(b, x, y, z, k) with (b, k) ∈ {(+1, 6), (−1, 2), (−1, 1), (+1, 5)} and executions of XorQuery 3 , is also upper bounded by the number of P/P −1 queries made by the distinguisher (unless event bad = cbad ∨ xbad occurs), which is upper bounded by q. This implies that at most q recursive queries to F 3 and F 4 can occur, unless event bad occurs. Since the distinguisher himself makes at mostueries to F 3 and F 4 , the total size of F 3 and F 4 histories in the simulator is then upper bounded by q + q = 2 · q. The 3-chains from Lines (F 2 , +), (F 3 , +), (F 4 , −) and (F 5 , −) always include elements from both F 3 and F 4 histories. Therefore, the number of such 3-chains is upper bounded by (2q) 2 = 4 · q 2 . This implies that the simulator makes at most 4q 2 recursive queries to F 1 , F 2 , F 5 and F 6 when dealing with these 3-chains. Moreover from Lemma 3 the number of recursive queries made by XorQuery 1 and XorQuery 2 algorithms to F 1 , F 2 , F 5 and F 6 is upper-bounded by the number of P/P −1 queries made by the distinguisher, which is upper-bounded by q, unless event xbad occurs. Since the distinguisher can make at most q direct calls to F 1 , F 2 , F 5 and F 6 , the history size of F 1 , F 2 , F 5 and F 6 remains upper-bounded by 4q 2 + q + q < 5q 2 , unless event bad occurs. Therefore, taking:
we obtain that the simulator does not reach the bound B max , except if event bad occurs; from inequalities (10), (11) and equation (13), we obtain (12). ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 5. With B max = 5 · q 2 , the simulator makes at most 2 10 · q 8 queries to P/P −1 and runs in time O(q 8 ).
Proof. The simulator makes queries to P/P −1 is the following three cases: Since the history size of the F i 's is upper bounded by B max = 5 · q 2 , the number of P/P −1 -queries for Case 1 is at most Q 1 = 4 · (B max ) 2 . Since CompleteChain algorithm gets called at most B max times, the number of P/P −1 -queries for Case 2 is at most Q 2 = B max . Finally since the history size of the F i 's is upper bounded by B max = 5 · q 2 , the number of P/P −1 -queries for Case 3 is at most Q 3 = (B max ) 4 .
Therefore, the number Q P of P/P −1 -queries made by the simulator is at most:
From this we have that the simulator runs in time O(q 8 ).
⊓ ⊔
This completes the first part of the proof of Lemma 1.
A.2 Simulator's Failure Probability
We must show that the simulator never aborts at Step 9 in the CompleteChain algorithm, except with negligible probability. We denote by Abort 9 the event that the simulator aborts at Step 9 in the CompleteChain algorithm. We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6. With B max = 5 · q 2 , the event Abort 9 occurs with probability at most :
In the simulator, we have that a call to Query generates a call to ChainQuery, which can in turn generate recursive calls to ChainQuery. Given a call to ChainQuery(x, k), we denote by H the simulator's history at this point, excluding (x, F k (x)). If ChainQuery(x, k) originates from a previous call to CompleteChain, let x 1 , . . . , x r be the elements for which F k i (x i ) has been defined in the CompleteChain call, and let denote by H ′ the history H where the elements (x i , F k i (x i )) are excluded. We distinguish two types of calls to ChainQuery(x, k): 
Lemma 7.
If Query(x, k) occurs, then the corresponding ChainQuery(x, k) is of Type I, except with probability at most 2 7 · q 5 /2 n .
Proof. If Query(x, k) occurs, then F k (x) $ ← {0, 1} n occurs, which implies that F k (x) is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n given H ′ and Chain(±1, x, k). For k = 2 and letting X = x, this implies that R = F 2 (X) ⊕ Y belongs to the history of F 1 , except with probability at most |F 1 |/2 n . This holds for a single 3-chain (X, Y, Z). Considering all 3-chains with (Y, Z) ∈ Chain(+1, X, 2), this occurs with probability at most |F 1 | · |F 3 | · |F 4 |/2 n . Considering all possible values of k, we have that ChainQuery(x, k) is of Type I, except with probability at most:
We now proceed to show that for any ChainQuery(x, k) of Type I, the simulator does not abort at Step 9 of the corresponding CompleteChain, except with negligible probability. Moreover, a subsequent call to ChainQuery is either of Type I, or it is of Type II and the simulator does not abort, and then any subsequent ChainQuery call is then again of type I. We start the analysis with Lines (F 2 , +) and (F 5 , −). (F 2 , +) and (F 5 , −)). If ChainQuery(X, 2) is of Type I, then considering any 3-chain (X, Y, Z) where (Y, Z) ∈ Chain(+1, X, 2), the simulator does not abort during the corresponding CompleteChain call, and any subsequent ChainQuery is also of Type I, except with probability at most 2 6 · q 4 /2 n . Symmetrically, if ChainQuery(A, 5) is of Type I, then considering any 3-chain (A, Y, Z) where (Y, Z) ∈ Chain(−1, A, 5), the simulator does not abort during the corresponding CompleteChain call, and any subsequent ChainQuery is also of Type I, except with probability at most 2 6 · q 4 /2 n . Proof. We do the analysis for Line (F 2 , +). The analysis for (F 5 , −) is symmetric so we omit it. We consider a Type I call to ChainQuery(X, 2), and we denote by (X, Y, Z) any 3-chain, with (Y, Z) ∈ Chain(+1, X, 2). For this line, the "adapt" operation occurs for F 5 and F 6 , with an additional call to F 1 .
Lemma 8 (Lines
We first show that the simulator does not abort at Step 9 of CompleteChain, except with negligible probability. Since (F 2 , +) is of Type I, we have that R = F 2 (X) ⊕ Y does not belong to the history of F 1 ; therefore F 1 (R) $ ← {0, 1} n occurs and L = F 1 (R) ⊕ X has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n , which implies that S in S T = P (L R) has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n . Therefore S is not in the history of F 6 , except with probability at most |F 6 |/2 n . Moreover, we can't have that A = F 4 (Z) ⊕ Y is in the history of F 5 , otherwise the 3-chain (Y, Z, A) would already have been completed (from Lines (F 3 , +) and (F 5 , −) in Table 1 ), and X would already be in the history of F 2 . Therefore, we obtain that A is not in the history of F 5 and S is not in the history of F 6 , except with probability at most |F 6 |/2 n ≤ 5 · q 2 /2 n . Therefore, the simulator does not abort at Step 9 of CompleteChain, except with probability at most 5 · q 2 /2 n .
We now consider a recursive call to ChainQuery(A, 5). Letting A = Y ⊕ F 4 (Z), we have that F 5 (A) ← Z ⊕ S occurred, which implies from the previous analysis that F 5 (A) has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n given H ′ . This implies that for any (Y ′ , Z ′ ) ∈ Chain(−1, A, 5), S ′ = F 5 (A) ⊕ Z ′ does not belong to the history of F 6 , except with probability at most |F 6 |/2 n ≤ 5q 2 /2 n . Therefore, any subsequent call to ChainQuery(A, 5) call will be of Type I, except with probability at most 5q 2 /2 n .
From the previous analysis, we also have that F 1 (R) $ ← {0, 1} n must occur, so any subsequent call to ChainQuery(R, 1) is also of Type I.
Finally, we show that a subsequent call to ChainQuery(S, 6) cannot occur, except with negligible probability. Namely, from the previous analysis S has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n given H ′ ; therefore, the probability that there exists R in F 1 and X ∈ F 2 such that S T = P (X ⊕ F 1 (R) R) for some T is at most |F 1 | · |F 2 |/2 n ≤ 2 5 · q 4 /2 n . ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 9 (Lines (F 1 , +) and (F 6 , −)). If ChainQuery(R, 1) is of Type I, then the simulator does not abort, and any subsequent call to ChainQuery is also of Type I, except with probability at most 2 8 · q 6 /2 n . Symmetrically, if ChainQuery(S, 6) is of Type I, then the simulator does not abort, and any subsequent call to ChainQuery is also of Type I, except with probability at most 2 8 · q 6 /2 n .
Proof. We consider a call to ChainQuery(R, 1). The analysis for Line (F 6 , +) is symmetric so we omit it. We have that there is at most one 3-chain (R, A, S) with (A, S) ∈ Chain(−1, R, 1); otherwise this would give two 3-chains (R, A, S) and (R, A ′ , S ′ ) with the same R; then Line (F 5 , +) would already have been called for these two 3-chains, and R would already be in the history of F 1 , a contradiction. For Line (F 1 , −) the "adapt" operation occurs for F 2 and F 3 , with an additional call to $ ← {0, 1} n has occurred, which implies that X = F 1 (R) ⊕ L has the random distribution in {0, 1} n . Therefore, X is in the history of F 2 with probability at most |F 2 |/2 n . This shows that the simulator does not abort at
Step 9 of CompleteChain for F 2 , except with probability at most |F 2 |/2 n ≤ 5q 2 /2 n . Now we show that no recursive call to ChainQuery(X, 2) can occur, except with negligible probability. Namely, since X has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n , the probability that there
is at most |F 3 |·|F 4 |/2 n , so Line (F 2 , +) gets recursively called with probability at most |F 3 | · |F 4 |/2 n . Similarly, the probability that there exists (R ′ , S ′ ) ∈ (F 1 , F 6 ) such that P (F 1 (R ′ )⊕X R ′ ) = S ′ T ′ for some T ′ is at most |F 1 |·|F 6 |/2 n , and the probability that there exists (R ′ , R ′′ , X ′′ ) ∈ (F 1 , F 1 , F 2 ) with (R ′ , X) = (R ′′ , X ′′ ) and
Therefore, not transition to (F 2 , +) or (F 2 , −) can occur, except with probability at most (|F 3 | · |F 4 
We now show that the simulator does not abort for the definition of F 3 (Y ). We distinguish two cases. If Z = F 5 (A) ⊕ S is in the history of F 4 , then Y = F 4 (Z) ⊕ A cannot be in the history of F 3 , otherwise from Lines (F 3 , +) and (F 5 , −) in Table 1 the 3-chain (Y, Z, A) would already have been completed, and R would already be in the history of F 1 . Alternatively, if Z is not in the history of F 4 , then the operation F 4 (Z) $ ← {0, 1} n occurs, which implies that Y = F 4 (Z) ⊕ A is in the history of F 3 with probability at most |F 3 |/2 n . Therefore, Y is not in the history of F 3 , except with probability at most |F 3 |/2 n ≤ 2q/2 n .
We now show that if ChainQuery(Y, 3) gets recursively called, then it is of Type I. Let (Y, Z ′ , A ′ ) be a 3-chain with (Z ′ , A ′ ) ∈ Chain(Y, 3). We have that F 3 (Y ) ← X ⊕ Z occurred, which implies that:
has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n . Therefore we obtain that:
has also the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n . Therefore, X ′ does not belong to F 2 \ {X}, except with probability at most |F 2 |/2 n . Now we show that we must have
and since we must have (Z ′ , A ′ ) = (Z, A), we obtain that Z ′ = Z. From (15) and (16) we have that Z ⊕ Z ′ = X ⊕ X ′ , which using Z ′ = Z gives X ′ = X; this implies that X ′ does not belong to the history of F 2 , except with probability at most |F 2 |/2 n ≤ 5q 2 /2 n . Therefore, a recursive call to ChainQuery(Y, 3) is of Type I, except with probability at most 5q 2 /2 n .
Finally, we have that if ChainQuery(Z, 4) is called, then F 4 (Z) $ ← {0, 1} n must have occurred. Therefore, for any 3-chain (Z, X ′ , Y ′ ) such that (X ′ , Y ′ ) ∈ Chain(+1, Z, 4), we have that A ′ = F 4 (Z) ⊕ Y ′ is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n and belongs to the history of F 5 with probability at most |F 5 |/2 n ≤ 5q 2 /2 n . Therefore, a recursive call to ChainQuery(Z, 4) is of Type I, except with probability at most 5q 2 /2 n . ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 10 (Lines (F 2 , −) and (F 5 , +)). If a call to ChainQuery(X, 2) is of Type I, then for any (R, S) ∈ Chain(−1, X, 2), the simulator does not abort in the corresponding CompleteChain. Symmetrically, if a call to ChainQuery(A, 5) is of Type I, then for any (R, S) ∈ Chain(+1, A, 5), the simulator does not abort in the corresponding CompleteChain. Both properties hold except with probability at most 2 6 · q 4 /2 n .
Proof. We consider a call to ChainQuery(X, 2) and more specifically Line (F 2 , −). The argument for Line (F 5 , +) is symmetric so we omit it. For Line (F 2 , −), the "adapt" operation occurs for F 4 and F 5 , with possibly an additional call to F 3 . We consider any 3-chain (X, R, S) with (R, S) ∈ Chain(−1, R, 2). First, we show that the simulator does not abort at Step 9 of the corresponding call to CompleteChain, except with negligible probability. Since the ChainQuery(X, 2) call is of Type I, we have that F 2 (X) is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n given H ′ . Therefore Y = F 2 (X) ⊕ R has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n , and so Y belongs to the history of F 3 with probability at most
$ ← {0, 1} n occurs, and Z = X ⊕ F 3 (Y ) does not belong to the history of F 4 , except with probability at most |F 4 |/2 n . Moreover letting S T = P (X ⊕ F 1 (R) R) and A = F 6 (S)⊕T , we have that A does not belong to the history of F 5 , since otherwise Line (F 5 , +) would already have been called for 3-chain (A, R, S), and X would already be in the history of F 2 , a contradiction. Therefore, the simulator does not abort at Step 9 of CompleteChain, except with probability at most (
Fig. 6 . Random variables involved in the analysis of ChainQuery(X, 2) with 3-chains (X, R, S) and (X, Ri, Si).
We now consider a recursive call to ChainQuery(Y, 3). This recursive call was generated by 3-chain (X, R, S), with (R, S) ∈ Chain(−1, X, 2); this gives Y = F 2 (X) ⊕ R. We let {(X, R i , S i )} be the set of other 3-chains for Line (F 2 , −), with (R i , S i ) ∈ Chain(−1, X, 2) \ {(R, S)}. For 3-chain (X, R, S), we let:
and for the other 3-chains (X, R i , S i ), we let: $ ← {0, 1} n occurred; this implies that X ′ = F 3 (Y )⊕Z ′ has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n given H ′ . We distinguish two cases:
, 1} n occurred, we have that X ′ = F 3 (Y ) ⊕ Z ′ has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n and does not belong to the history of F 2 , except with probability at most |F 2 |/2 n ; therefore the recursive call to ChainQuery(Y, 3) is of Type I, except with probability at most |F 4 | · |F 2 | ≤ 2 4 q 3 /2 n . If Z ′ = Z i for some i, then we must also show that X ′ = F 3 (Y ) ⊕ Z i does not belong to the history of F 2 , except with negligible probability. We have:
we have:
and letting A ′′ = Y i ⊕ F 4 (Z), we have that:
Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 6 we have that the 3-chains (Y, Z i , A i ⊕R⊕R i ) and (Y i , Z, A⊕ R ⊕ R i ) lead to the same value:
as input of F 2 . Therefore we must check that when 3-chain (Y, Z i , A ′ ) is considered, where 
this in turn generated the call to ChainQuery(X, 2), which let Y ← F 2 (X) ⊕ R and
has not yet occurred at this point, we have that A ′′ / ∈ F 4 ; this implies that the definition of Z and Y i does not generate a 3-chain with (Y i , Z, A ′′ ). Therefore, we obtain that:
is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n and does not belong to the history of F 2 , except with probability at most |F 2 |/2 n ≤ 5q 2 /2 n . This implies that the ChainQuery(Y, 3) call is of Type I, except with probability at most
Conversely, if ChainQuery(A ′′ , 5) occurred before ChainQuery(A, 5), then from A ′′ = A ⊕ R ⊕ R i we have that the ChainQuery(A ′′ , 5) call generated a call to XorQuery 1 (A ′′ , 5), which generated a call to ChainQuery(A, 5). Then the 3-chain (A, R, S) was completed and this lead to F 2 (X) $ ← {0, 1} n . In this case the 3-chain (X, R, S) is already completed and is therefore not considered for the corresponding ChainQuery(X, 2) call; we get a contradiction since we have assumed that 3-chain (X, R, S) was considered for ChainQuery(X, 2). Therefore, this second case cannot happen. Now we show that no recursive call to CompleteChain corresponding to ChainQuery(Z, 4)
can occur. Namely we have that F 3 (Y ) $ ← {0, 1} n occurred, which implies that Z = F 3 (Y ) ⊕ X has the random distribution in {0, 1} n . This implies that the probability that there exists
for some i, then we must have:
From the previous analysis we have that X ′′ is not in the history of F 2 when the ChainQuery(Z, 4) call occurs. Therefore, we have that no recursive call to CompleteChain corresponding to the ChainQuery(Z, 4) call can occur, except with probability at most 10q 3 /2 n . Finally, we show that a recursive call to ChainQuery(A, 5) is of Type I. Namely from the previous analysis we have that F 3 (Y ) $ ← {0, 1} n occurs, and F 5 (A) ← Z ⊕ S occurs, which implies that:
has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n given H ′ . Therefore, for any (Y ′ , Z ′ ) ∈ Chain(−1, A, 5), we have that S ′ = F 5 (A) ⊕ Z ′ has the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n and does not belong For R ′ = R i , we obtain (see Figure 7 ):
We distinguish two cases:
-ChainQuery(Y ′ , 3) occurred before ChainQuery(S ′ , 6). If ChainQuery(S ′ , 6) occurred before ChainQuery(Y ′ , 3), then XorQuery 2 (S ′ , 6) has also occurred before ChainQuery(Y ′ , 3). Moreover, given that Y ′ = Y ⊕ R i ⊕ R and the values of R and R i depend on F 4 (Z) and F 4 (Z i ), we have that a call to XorQuery 2 (Z, 4) and to XorQuery 2 (Z i , 4) must also have occurred before ChainQuery(Y ′ , 3). From any of the calls to XorQuery 2 (S ′ , 6), XorQuery 2 (Z, 4) and XorQuery 2 (Z i , 4), a call to ChainQuery(R i , 1) must have occurred, which generated the call to ChainQuery(Y, 3), which in turn generated the call to ChainQuery(X, 2); therefore, when the call to ChainQuery(X, 2) occurred, Y ′ was not in the history of F 3 . Therefore
$ ← {0, 1} n occurs, and Z ′ = X ⊕ F 3 (Y ′ ) does not belong to the history of F 4 , except with probability at most |F 4 |/2 n ≤ 2q/2 n . Moreover we have that A ′ = F 6 (S ′ )⊕T ′ does not belong to the history of F 5 , since otherwise 3-chain (A ′ , R ′ , S ′ ) would have been completed before 3-chain (X, R ′ , S ′ ). Therefore, we have that the simulator does not abort at Step 9 for the recursive call to ChainQuery(X, 2), except with probability at most 2q/2 n . Using the same analysis as in the proof of Lemma 10, we obtain that no recursive call to CompleteChain corresponding to ChainQuery(Z ′ , 4) can occur, except with probability at most 10q 3 /2 n ; moreover, a recursive call to ChainQuery(A ′ , 5), if any, must be of Type I, except with probability at most 2 5 · q 4 /2 n . B A Note on Indifferentiability in the Honest-but-Curious Model
In this section, we show that LR with up to logarithmic number of rounds is not indifferentiable from a random permutation in the honest-but-curious model [11] ; combined with our main result in the general model, this provides a separation between the two models. Note that this observation does not contradict any result formally proven in [11] ; it only shows that honestbut-curious indifferentiability is not necessarily weaker than general indifferentiability. Roughly speaking, in the honest-but-curious indifferentiability model, the distinguisher cannot query the F i 's directly. It can only make two types of queries: direct queries to the LR/LR −1 construction, and queries to the LR/LR −1 construction where in addition the intermediate results of the F i 's is provided. When interacting with the random permutation P and a simulator S, the first type of query is sent directly to P , while the second type is sent to S who makes the corresponding query to P , and in addition provides a simulated transcript of intermediate F i results. Note that the simulator S is not allowed to make additional queries to P apart from forwarding the queries from the distinguisher; see [11] for a precise definition.
The authors of [11] define the notion of a transparent construction. Roughly speaking, this is a construction C F such that the value of random oracle F (x) can be computed efficiently for any x, by making a polynomial number of queries to C F and getting the F outputs used by C F to answer each query. The authors show that Luby-Rackoff with up to logarithmic number of rounds is a transparent construction. Namely the authors construct an extracting algorithm E such that when given oracle access to LR and the intermediate values F i used to compute LR, the value F i (x) can be computed for any x at any round i. We note that algorithm E does not make queries to LR −1 , only to LR.
Algorithm E implies that for a LR construction with up to logarithmic number of rounds, it is possible to find an input message L R such that the value S in S T = LR(L R) has a predetermined value, by only making forward queries to LR; namely this is how algorithm E can obtain F ℓ (S), where ℓ is the last round. But this task is clearly impossible with a random permutation P : it is infeasible to find L R such that S in S T = P (L R) has a pre-determined value while only making forward queries to P . This implies that a simulator in the honestbut-curious model will necessarily fail (recall that such a simulator only forwards queries from the distinguisher to P and cannot make his own queries to P/P −1 ). Therefore, LR with up to logarithmic number of rounds is not indifferentiable from a random permutation in the honestbut-curious model. Since our main result is that LR with 6 rounds is indifferentiable from a random permutation in the general model, this provides a separation between the two models.
